FROM LAW AND ORDER TO PACIFICATION: BRITAIN’S SUPPRESSION
OF THE ARAB
REVOLT IN PALESTINE, 1936-39
REVOLT IN PALESTINE, 1936-39
MATTHEW HUGHES
This article examines British human rights
abuses against non-combatants during the 1936-39 Arab Revolt in Palestine,
contextualizing brutality in Palestine within British military practice
and law for dealing with colonial rebellions in force at the
time. It shows that the norms for such operations, and the laws that codified
military actions, allowed for some level of systemic, systematic
brutality in the form of “collective punishments” and “reprisals” by the British army.
The article also details the effects of military actions on Palestinian civilians and rebels and describes torture carried out by the British on Palestinians. Finally, it highlights a methodological problem in examining these sorts of abuses: the paucity of official records and the mismatch between official and unofficial accounts of abuse during counterinsurgency.
The article also details the effects of military actions on Palestinian civilians and rebels and describes torture carried out by the British on Palestinians. Finally, it highlights a methodological problem in examining these sorts of abuses: the paucity of official records and the mismatch between official and unofficial accounts of abuse during counterinsurgency.
IN APRIL 1936, the
Palestinians launched a countrywide revolt against British
rule in Mandatory Palestine and the official policy of support for Jewish immi-
gration to the country. While interrupted by a cease-fire from October 1936
to September 1937, the rebellion reached its peak of intensity in 1938, before
petering out in mid- to late 1939 with the approaching war in Europe. For
long stretches of the rebellion, the British lost control of Palestine, including
many major towns and, for about five days in October 1938, the Old City of
Jerusalem. This was a substantial colonial revolt requiring a remarkably large
force deployment by Britain: two full infantry divisions, or some twenty-five
thousand men, with supporting arms by 1938. Most British infantry regiments
served in Palestine at one time or another between 1936 and 1939.
rule in Mandatory Palestine and the official policy of support for Jewish immi-
gration to the country. While interrupted by a cease-fire from October 1936
to September 1937, the rebellion reached its peak of intensity in 1938, before
petering out in mid- to late 1939 with the approaching war in Europe. For
long stretches of the rebellion, the British lost control of Palestine, including
many major towns and, for about five days in October 1938, the Old City of
Jerusalem. This was a substantial colonial revolt requiring a remarkably large
force deployment by Britain: two full infantry divisions, or some twenty-five
thousand men, with supporting arms by 1938. Most British infantry regiments
served in Palestine at one time or another between 1936 and 1939.
The severity of the rebellion, along
with a shortage of troops in Palestine
when it erupted, limited Britain’s initial response. By the time regiments were
en route to Palestine and the army was ready for protracted military action
in autumn 1936, a royal commission of inquiry led by Lord Peel was on its
way to the country to investigate the causes of the revolt and determine the
when it erupted, limited Britain’s initial response. By the time regiments were
en route to Palestine and the army was ready for protracted military action
in autumn 1936, a royal commission of inquiry led by Lord Peel was on its
way to the country to investigate the causes of the revolt and determine the
BRITAIN’S SUPPRESSION OF THE ARAB REVOLT IN PALESTINE 7
territory’s future, resulting in a temporary
suspension of guerrilla activity. The
commission’s failure, and notably the publication in summer 1937 of its report
recommending the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, triggered
a sharp recrudescence of the rebellion by early autumn. Though the British
army had ramped up its repression as of October 1937, at the same time
increasingly taking charge from the police and civil authorities, the need to
hold back troops for a possible European war restricted what it could do. The
Munich settlement in September 1938 freed it from this constraint, enabling
it to send strong reinforcements to Palestine. Beginning in October 1938,
British troops started to flood the country, making possible the tough, exten-
sive repression in the field that eventually defeated the rebellion. The influx
of troops and the gradual introduction of military courts and forms of martial
law as of autumn 1937 boosted the army’s position, and ordinary Palestinians
would feel the brunt of Britain’s military power.
commission’s failure, and notably the publication in summer 1937 of its report
recommending the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, triggered
a sharp recrudescence of the rebellion by early autumn. Though the British
army had ramped up its repression as of October 1937, at the same time
increasingly taking charge from the police and civil authorities, the need to
hold back troops for a possible European war restricted what it could do. The
Munich settlement in September 1938 freed it from this constraint, enabling
it to send strong reinforcements to Palestine. Beginning in October 1938,
British troops started to flood the country, making possible the tough, exten-
sive repression in the field that eventually defeated the rebellion. The influx
of troops and the gradual introduction of military courts and forms of martial
law as of autumn 1937 boosted the army’s position, and ordinary Palestinians
would feel the brunt of Britain’s military power.
LAW AND ORDER
Britain had long experience with
colonial rebellions and had practical tra-
ditions and legal systems in place to deal with them. As far back as 1896, an
influential volume by Colonel C. E. Callwell titled Small Wars: Their Principles
and Practice described counterinsurgency methods from places such as the
northwest frontier of India that would later be employed in Palestine:
ditions and legal systems in place to deal with them. As far back as 1896, an
influential volume by Colonel C. E. Callwell titled Small Wars: Their Principles
and Practice described counterinsurgency methods from places such as the
northwest frontier of India that would later be employed in Palestine:
The adoption of guerrilla methods by the enemy
almost neces-
sarily forces the regular troops to resort to punitive measures
directed against the possessions of their antagonists. It must be
remembered that one way to get the enemy to fight is to make
raids on his property—only the most cowardly of savages and
irregulars will allow their cattle to be carried off or their houses
to be destroyed without making some show of resistance. . . . [I]t
sarily forces the regular troops to resort to punitive measures
directed against the possessions of their antagonists. It must be
remembered that one way to get the enemy to fight is to make
raids on his property—only the most cowardly of savages and
irregulars will allow their cattle to be carried off or their houses
to be destroyed without making some show of resistance. . . . [I]t
has generally been found very useful to send
raiding parties con-
sisting of mounted men great distances to carry off the enemy
flocks and herds or to destroy encampments and villages.1
sisting of mounted men great distances to carry off the enemy
flocks and herds or to destroy encampments and villages.1
While concentrating on the military
tactics to be used against local rebels,
Callwell also provided details on how to deal with the civilian population who,
as “uncivilised races attribute leniency to timidity,” must be “thoroughly brought
to book and cowed or they will rise again.”2 Collective punitive measures such
as “destroying villages, carrying off livestock and trampling down crops and so
on,” already well established in irregular “small” wars against guerrillas by the
time Callwell wrote his book, were used in the Boer War (1899-1902), during
the Egyptian and Iraqi revolts (1919-20), in India, and during the Irish War of
Independence (1919-21).3 In the 1930s, Major General Sir Charles Gwynn
and Colonel H. J. Simson—the latter served in Palestine during the revolt—
developed Callwell’s lessons, applying them to imperial hot spots such as
Palestine and arguing that such situations required firm military rule.4
Callwell also provided details on how to deal with the civilian population who,
as “uncivilised races attribute leniency to timidity,” must be “thoroughly brought
to book and cowed or they will rise again.”2 Collective punitive measures such
as “destroying villages, carrying off livestock and trampling down crops and so
on,” already well established in irregular “small” wars against guerrillas by the
time Callwell wrote his book, were used in the Boer War (1899-1902), during
the Egyptian and Iraqi revolts (1919-20), in India, and during the Irish War of
Independence (1919-21).3 In the 1930s, Major General Sir Charles Gwynn
and Colonel H. J. Simson—the latter served in Palestine during the revolt—
developed Callwell’s lessons, applying them to imperial hot spots such as
Palestine and arguing that such situations required firm military rule.4
8 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
The British military legal system
supported harsh measures by troops fight-
ing insurgents, especially those operating outside the United Kingdom. Soldiers
in Palestine were bound by the King’s Regulations (reissued in 1935 with a
section titled “Duties in Aid of the Civil Power” that largely related to troops’
conduct in the United Kingdom) and the 1929 Manual of Military Law, a bulky
hardback volume whose key points were abridged in pocket-sized pamphlets
such as Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934 and the 1937 Duties in the Aid of the
Civil Power that officers could take with them on operations.5 The 1929 manual,
an updated compilation of periodically reissued manuals of law stretching back
to 1884, forbade stealing from and maltreating civilians. It also made clear that
soldiers were subject to civil as well as military law and that an “act which
constitutes an offence if committed by a civilian is none the less an offence if
committed by a soldier.”6
ing insurgents, especially those operating outside the United Kingdom. Soldiers
in Palestine were bound by the King’s Regulations (reissued in 1935 with a
section titled “Duties in Aid of the Civil Power” that largely related to troops’
conduct in the United Kingdom) and the 1929 Manual of Military Law, a bulky
hardback volume whose key points were abridged in pocket-sized pamphlets
such as Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934 and the 1937 Duties in the Aid of the
Civil Power that officers could take with them on operations.5 The 1929 manual,
an updated compilation of periodically reissued manuals of law stretching back
to 1884, forbade stealing from and maltreating civilians. It also made clear that
soldiers were subject to civil as well as military law and that an “act which
constitutes an offence if committed by a civilian is none the less an offence if
committed by a soldier.”6
That said, the manual also established a legal framework
for shooting rioters
and allowed for “collective punishments” and “retribution,” whose loose definitions
gave field commanders considerable leeway in interpreting the rules. The 1929
law clearly stated that where coercion was required or where terrorism needed to
be checked, collective punishment and reprisals that would “inflict suffering upon
innocent individuals” were “indispensable as a last resource.”7 According to the
law, “The existence of an armed insurrection would justify the use of any degree
of force necessary effectually to meet and cope with the insurrection.”8
and allowed for “collective punishments” and “retribution,” whose loose definitions
gave field commanders considerable leeway in interpreting the rules. The 1929
law clearly stated that where coercion was required or where terrorism needed to
be checked, collective punishment and reprisals that would “inflict suffering upon
innocent individuals” were “indispensable as a last resource.”7 According to the
law, “The existence of an armed insurrection would justify the use of any degree
of force necessary effectually to meet and cope with the insurrection.”8
Strictly speaking, the 1929 manual
applied these punitive laws only to civilians
living under military occupation during wartime. In the case of Palestine, the mili-
tary rule imposed by Britain in 1917 was lifted in 1920 with the establishment
in the country of a civil government, but collective punishment was explicitly
permitted under the Ordinances and Orders in Council introduced in Palestine
by the Mandate authorities in 1922 and regularly updated thereafter. Indeed,
living under military occupation during wartime. In the case of Palestine, the mili-
tary rule imposed by Britain in 1917 was lifted in 1920 with the establishment
in the country of a civil government, but collective punishment was explicitly
permitted under the Ordinances and Orders in Council introduced in Palestine
by the Mandate authorities in 1922 and regularly updated thereafter. Indeed,
a “Collective
Responsibility for Crime Ordinance”
dates
The principles (and practice)
of collective punishment and reprisals
were an
established part of rule
and repression in Palestine.
back to 1921.9 The British
used these local laws when
implementing collective punishments on
Palestinians and villages,
referring to them after April 1936 as “emergency” laws. The 1934 and 1937 pamphlets cited above provide further
proof that the principles (and practice) of collective punishment and
reprisals were an established part of rule and repression in Palestine.
Civil proceedings against servicemen
for individual offenses during coun-
terinsurgency operations were theoretically possible, but a strict reading of
the military law in force meant that in practice soldiers had little reason to
fear disciplinary action for most excesses, including theft, torture, and assault.
Victims could take out civil proceedings only against individual soldiers (the
state being immune from prosecution until the 1947 Crown Proceedings Act),
and even then, it had to be proven that the soldiers were acting beyond their
lawful operational orders. This was not practicable. One Palestinian claimed that
soldier “number 65” had beaten him, not realizing that all the men from that unit,
the York and Lancaster Regiment (formerly the 65th Foot), carried this number
terinsurgency operations were theoretically possible, but a strict reading of
the military law in force meant that in practice soldiers had little reason to
fear disciplinary action for most excesses, including theft, torture, and assault.
Victims could take out civil proceedings only against individual soldiers (the
state being immune from prosecution until the 1947 Crown Proceedings Act),
and even then, it had to be proven that the soldiers were acting beyond their
lawful operational orders. This was not practicable. One Palestinian claimed that
soldier “number 65” had beaten him, not realizing that all the men from that unit,
the York and Lancaster Regiment (formerly the 65th Foot), carried this number
9
on the left side of their helmets.10 This author has
found only one successful prosecution of servicemen in Palestine—that of
four British police officers who blatantly executed an Arab prisoner in a
street in Jaffa. The case was prosecuted only because a number of non-British
European residents witnessed the incident and complained. (The complaints
of Arabs never resulted in a prosecution.) The killing led to an investigation
and the charging of the four officers who received minimal sentences, reduced
on appeal.11
After September 1936, the army established military courts and
regulations
in Palestine that were separate from the ordinary civil courts and not open to
the usual legal challenges. The shift from a civil to a military judiciary was partial
and gradual, but the general effect was that legal appeals by Arabs would either
fail or not be allowed.12 While British forces in Palestine during the revolt offi-
cially operated as an aid to the civil power, conditions in the country in practice
approached martial law, a situation that further eased civil limits on soldiers’
behavior. The British never instituted full (or “real”) martial law in Palestine, but
in a series of Orders in Council and emergency regulations after 1936 they issued
“statutory” martial law, a level between semimilitary rule under civil powers and
full martial law under military powers where the army and not the civil high
commissioner had the upper hand.13 After September 1937, when the rebellion
intensified, the army increasingly took charge in Palestine, with the “full power
of search and arrest, independent of the police, and the right to shoot and kill
any man attempting to escape search or ignoring challenges.”14
in Palestine that were separate from the ordinary civil courts and not open to
the usual legal challenges. The shift from a civil to a military judiciary was partial
and gradual, but the general effect was that legal appeals by Arabs would either
fail or not be allowed.12 While British forces in Palestine during the revolt offi-
cially operated as an aid to the civil power, conditions in the country in practice
approached martial law, a situation that further eased civil limits on soldiers’
behavior. The British never instituted full (or “real”) martial law in Palestine, but
in a series of Orders in Council and emergency regulations after 1936 they issued
“statutory” martial law, a level between semimilitary rule under civil powers and
full martial law under military powers where the army and not the civil high
commissioner had the upper hand.13 After September 1937, when the rebellion
intensified, the army increasingly took charge in Palestine, with the “full power
of search and arrest, independent of the police, and the right to shoot and kill
any man attempting to escape search or ignoring challenges.”14
Thus, starting from late 1937 or
early 1938, Palestine was under de facto
if not de jure martial law of some sort. Nor was military rule much affected
by the international laws in place at the time (e.g., the succession of Geneva
Conventions from 1864 to 1929 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907)
as these dealt mainly with the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners
of war (POWs) rather than with the maltreatment of civilians. Britain had clas-
sified the Arab Revolt as an internal insurrection and not an international war,
thereby denying POW status to captured Arab fighters and allowing them to
be treated as civilian criminals subject to ordinary civil law modified by condi-
tions of martial law, such as the death penalty for carrying a weapon or ammu-
nition. To be fair, the British never entirely removed civil authority in Palestine
from the decision-making process, but by 1938, the high commissioner tem-
pered rather than directed the actions of British armed forces. When Sir Arthur
Wauchope, the high commissioner in place for the first phase of the revolt,
looked for a political solution to the revolt and challenged army efforts to insti-
tute martial law, he antagonized the armed forces who thought him too lenient
and referred to him as a “washout” and “ga-ga.”15 In March 1938, the Colonial
Office replaced him with the more compliant Sir Harold MacMichael.
if not de jure martial law of some sort. Nor was military rule much affected
by the international laws in place at the time (e.g., the succession of Geneva
Conventions from 1864 to 1929 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907)
as these dealt mainly with the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners
of war (POWs) rather than with the maltreatment of civilians. Britain had clas-
sified the Arab Revolt as an internal insurrection and not an international war,
thereby denying POW status to captured Arab fighters and allowing them to
be treated as civilian criminals subject to ordinary civil law modified by condi-
tions of martial law, such as the death penalty for carrying a weapon or ammu-
nition. To be fair, the British never entirely removed civil authority in Palestine
from the decision-making process, but by 1938, the high commissioner tem-
pered rather than directed the actions of British armed forces. When Sir Arthur
Wauchope, the high commissioner in place for the first phase of the revolt,
looked for a political solution to the revolt and challenged army efforts to insti-
tute martial law, he antagonized the armed forces who thought him too lenient
and referred to him as a “washout” and “ga-ga.”15 In March 1938, the Colonial
Office replaced him with the more compliant Sir Harold MacMichael.
PACIFICATION
Britain’s most spectacular single act
of destruction in Palestine was the
demolition of large parts of the old city of Jaffa just two months after the
demolition of large parts of the old city of Jaffa just two months after the
10 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
outbreak of the rebellion. Beginning on 16
June 1936 and continuing in sev-
eral phases to the end of the month, the British army, ostensibly to improve
the sanitation system, cut wide pathways through the old city with large gelig-
nite charges to allow military access to, and control of, a rebel-held area that
had previously eluded military control.16 In the process, the army blew up
between 220 and 240 multioccupancy buildings, rendering homeless up to
6,000 Palestinians, most of whom were left destitute, having been told by air-
dropped leaflets on the morning of 16 June to vacate their homes by 21:00
hours of the same day.17 Some families were left with nothing, not even a
change of clothes.18 As a British army intelligence officer observed, “That will
fucking well teach them.”19 Such vandalism shocked the British chief justice
in Palestine, Sir Michael McDonnell, who frankly condemned the action, for
which he was dismissed.20 Under strict censorship and therefore unable to
express outrage at the destruction of the heart of old Jaffa, the Palestinian
press resorted to irony. Jaffa’s leading newspaper, Filastin (Palestine), reported
how the “operation of making the city [Jaffa] more beautiful is carried out
through boxes of dynamite.”21 Al-Difa‘ (the Defense) headlined the assault
with “Goodbye, goodbye, old Jaffa, the army has exploded you.”22 Many Jaffans,
now refugees, ended up living in shanty towns, an ironic finale to an action
officially depicted as an attempt to “improve” health and sanitation.
eral phases to the end of the month, the British army, ostensibly to improve
the sanitation system, cut wide pathways through the old city with large gelig-
nite charges to allow military access to, and control of, a rebel-held area that
had previously eluded military control.16 In the process, the army blew up
between 220 and 240 multioccupancy buildings, rendering homeless up to
6,000 Palestinians, most of whom were left destitute, having been told by air-
dropped leaflets on the morning of 16 June to vacate their homes by 21:00
hours of the same day.17 Some families were left with nothing, not even a
change of clothes.18 As a British army intelligence officer observed, “That will
fucking well teach them.”19 Such vandalism shocked the British chief justice
in Palestine, Sir Michael McDonnell, who frankly condemned the action, for
which he was dismissed.20 Under strict censorship and therefore unable to
express outrage at the destruction of the heart of old Jaffa, the Palestinian
press resorted to irony. Jaffa’s leading newspaper, Filastin (Palestine), reported
how the “operation of making the city [Jaffa] more beautiful is carried out
through boxes of dynamite.”21 Al-Difa‘ (the Defense) headlined the assault
with “Goodbye, goodbye, old Jaffa, the army has exploded you.”22 Many Jaffans,
now refugees, ended up living in shanty towns, an ironic finale to an action
officially depicted as an attempt to “improve” health and sanitation.
While the destruction of old Jaffa
did not contravene the legal framework
and principles governing collective punishment discussed in the previous
section, the “pacification” permitted under these rules easily elided brutality
and torture and blurred the distinction between official and unofficial punish-
ment. Nor was there a clear division between what constituted “punishment,”
“reprisal,” or simply a “search,” a looseness facilitated by the leeway given to
officers in the field and by the fact that British regiments responded differently
to the stresses of suppressing the revolt. Most often, the widespread use of
punitive actions and destructive and brutal reprisals stopped short of actual
atrocity, but such actions were central to British military repression after 1936
and constituted the core experience for Palestinians during the revolt.
and principles governing collective punishment discussed in the previous
section, the “pacification” permitted under these rules easily elided brutality
and torture and blurred the distinction between official and unofficial punish-
ment. Nor was there a clear division between what constituted “punishment,”
“reprisal,” or simply a “search,” a looseness facilitated by the leeway given to
officers in the field and by the fact that British regiments responded differently
to the stresses of suppressing the revolt. Most often, the widespread use of
punitive actions and destructive and brutal reprisals stopped short of actual
atrocity, but such actions were central to British military repression after 1936
and constituted the core experience for Palestinians during the revolt.
The level of damage varied
considerably depending on time, place, and the
regiment involved, but whatever the law sanctioned, destruction and vandal-
ism were certainly a systematic, systemic part of British counterinsurgency
operations. The destruction could take the form of blowing up houses—often
the most impressive ones in the village—or vandalizing and smashing house-
hold effects. Alongside the destruction, servicemen often looted properties,
though this was not officially sanctioned. There were also “reprisals” in the
form of heavy collective fines, forced labor, and punitive village occupations
by government forces for which villagers bore the cost. One Arab rebel noted
that the British army was unable to “strike” the fighters so it had to resort to
“revenge” and “collective punishment.”23 Using air support, radio communica-
tions, intelligence, collaborators, and mobile columns, the British improved
their tactics against the rebel bands, but they never were able to defeat an
elusive enemy in open battle in rough terrain, so they adopted a two-pronged
regiment involved, but whatever the law sanctioned, destruction and vandal-
ism were certainly a systematic, systemic part of British counterinsurgency
operations. The destruction could take the form of blowing up houses—often
the most impressive ones in the village—or vandalizing and smashing house-
hold effects. Alongside the destruction, servicemen often looted properties,
though this was not officially sanctioned. There were also “reprisals” in the
form of heavy collective fines, forced labor, and punitive village occupations
by government forces for which villagers bore the cost. One Arab rebel noted
that the British army was unable to “strike” the fighters so it had to resort to
“revenge” and “collective punishment.”23 Using air support, radio communica-
tions, intelligence, collaborators, and mobile columns, the British improved
their tactics against the rebel bands, but they never were able to defeat an
elusive enemy in open battle in rough terrain, so they adopted a two-pronged
BRITAIN’S SUPPRESSION OF THE ARAB REVOLT IN PALESTINE 11
military approach, targeting enemy fighters
and the civilians on whom they relied for support.
The June 1936 operation in Jaffa was
atypical as troops by and large
avoided large-scale destruction in the bigger towns, although parts of Jenin
were destroyed following the assassination of a British colonial official, W. S. S.
Moffat, in the town in August 1938. Generally, it was the smaller, remote villages
in rural areas of Palestine that were singled out for incremental devastation.
Villages that proved particularly recalcitrant would be entirely demolished,
reduced to “mangled masonry,” as happened to the village of Mi‘ar, north of
Acre in October 1938.24 On other occasions, the British used sea mines from
the battleship HMS Malaya to destroy houses.25 Sometimes the charges laid
were so large that neighboring houses collapsed or flying debris hit bystand-
ers. The laying of oversized explosive charges by Royal Engineers to effect
maximum damage was intentional. British troops even made Palestinians
demolish their own houses, brick by brick.26
avoided large-scale destruction in the bigger towns, although parts of Jenin
were destroyed following the assassination of a British colonial official, W. S. S.
Moffat, in the town in August 1938. Generally, it was the smaller, remote villages
in rural areas of Palestine that were singled out for incremental devastation.
Villages that proved particularly recalcitrant would be entirely demolished,
reduced to “mangled masonry,” as happened to the village of Mi‘ar, north of
Acre in October 1938.24 On other occasions, the British used sea mines from
the battleship HMS Malaya to destroy houses.25 Sometimes the charges laid
were so large that neighboring houses collapsed or flying debris hit bystand-
ers. The laying of oversized explosive charges by Royal Engineers to effect
maximum damage was intentional. British troops even made Palestinians
demolish their own houses, brick by brick.26
During army searches, soldiers would
surround a village and then detach
and guard the women and children separately from the men, who were often
held in wire “cages” during protracted searches. In the meantime, soldiers
would “search” the empty houses, often destroying everything therein, burn-
ing grain and pouring olive oil over household food and effects.27 The village
men were also “screened” by having them pass in front of hooded or hidden
Arab informers who would nod when a “suspect” was found, or by British
officials checking their papers against lists of suspects. If the army was follow-
ing up an intelligence lead and looking for a suspect or hidden weapons, any
destruction was incidental to the searching of properties. Troops also used
primitive metal detectors on such operations.28 The army used the excuse of
weapons searches to justify damage if there were complaints.
and guard the women and children separately from the men, who were often
held in wire “cages” during protracted searches. In the meantime, soldiers
would “search” the empty houses, often destroying everything therein, burn-
ing grain and pouring olive oil over household food and effects.27 The village
men were also “screened” by having them pass in front of hooded or hidden
Arab informers who would nod when a “suspect” was found, or by British
officials checking their papers against lists of suspects. If the army was follow-
ing up an intelligence lead and looking for a suspect or hidden weapons, any
destruction was incidental to the searching of properties. Troops also used
primitive metal detectors on such operations.28 The army used the excuse of
weapons searches to justify damage if there were complaints.
Destruction of property was not part
of soldiers’ training, but once prompted
they did the job with gusto. The officer tasked with checking on a search carried
out in one village reprimanded a corporal who left intact a beautiful cabinet
full of glassware, and then proceeded to destroy the cabinet and its contents
himself.29 The British designated some searches as “punitive.” Recalling such
raids, a private remarked, “Oh yes, punitive. You smashed wardrobes with plates,
glass mirrors in[,] and furniture, anything you could see you smashed.”30 The
local district officer instructed Colonel J. S. S. Gratton, then a subaltern with the
Hampshire Regiment, that the unit’s search of Safad was a punitive raid, meaning
that (in Gratton’s words) they could “knock the place about”:
they did the job with gusto. The officer tasked with checking on a search carried
out in one village reprimanded a corporal who left intact a beautiful cabinet
full of glassware, and then proceeded to destroy the cabinet and its contents
himself.29 The British designated some searches as “punitive.” Recalling such
raids, a private remarked, “Oh yes, punitive. You smashed wardrobes with plates,
glass mirrors in[,] and furniture, anything you could see you smashed.”30 The
local district officer instructed Colonel J. S. S. Gratton, then a subaltern with the
Hampshire Regiment, that the unit’s search of Safad was a punitive raid, meaning
that (in Gratton’s words) they could “knock the place about”:
And it’s very alien to a chap like you or me
to go in and break the chair and kick chatty in with all the oil in and mixed it in with the bedclothes and break all the windows and everything. You don’t feel like doing it. And I remember the
adjutant coming in and saying, “You are not doing your stuff.
They’re perfectly intact all those houses you’ve just searched.
This is what you’ve got to do.” And he picked up a pick helve
adjutant coming in and saying, “You are not doing your stuff.
They’re perfectly intact all those houses you’ve just searched.
This is what you’ve got to do.” And he picked up a pick helve
12
and sort of burst everything. I said, “Right
OK,” so I got hold of the soldiers and said, “this is what you’ve got to do,” you know. And I don’t think they liked it much but once they’d started on it you couldn’t stop them. And you’d never seen
such devastation.31
such devastation.31
Following the search and cordon of
the town of Safad by the Hampshire
Regiment, a senior police officer in Palestine, Sir Charles Tegart, noted simply
that the soldiers “did their work thoroughly,” adding that local villagers had
little sympathy for the townsfolk of Safad, who had hitherto been spared and
who would now “know what has been happening to us.”32 For the soldiers,
their job in Palestine was simply “to bash anybody on the head who broke the
law, and if he didn’t want to be bashed on the head then he had to be shot. It
may sound brutal but in fact it was a reasonably nice, simple objective and the
soldiers understood it.”33 Hilda Wilson, a British school teacher in Palestine,
concluded that the reason for the soldiers’ destructiveness was that they were
“bored stiff” and had no social amenities, compounded by the alienation that
they felt serving “in a distant country among people who, they are told, are
the ‘enemy’.”34
Regiment, a senior police officer in Palestine, Sir Charles Tegart, noted simply
that the soldiers “did their work thoroughly,” adding that local villagers had
little sympathy for the townsfolk of Safad, who had hitherto been spared and
who would now “know what has been happening to us.”32 For the soldiers,
their job in Palestine was simply “to bash anybody on the head who broke the
law, and if he didn’t want to be bashed on the head then he had to be shot. It
may sound brutal but in fact it was a reasonably nice, simple objective and the
soldiers understood it.”33 Hilda Wilson, a British school teacher in Palestine,
concluded that the reason for the soldiers’ destructiveness was that they were
“bored stiff” and had no social amenities, compounded by the alienation that
they felt serving “in a distant country among people who, they are told, are
the ‘enemy’.”34
Variations between the “official” history of counter-rebel operations and
village searches and less formal versions of events suggest a hidden history—
when evidence can be found. The British response to the assassination of two
Black Watch Regiment soldiers near Jerusalem’s Jaffa Gate on 5 November
1937 is a case in point. In what would be classed as an “official” account,
General Sir Archibald Wavell, the overall commander in Palestine, remarked on
the restraint shown by the Black Watch (coincidentally, his old regiment) on a
subsequent operation against Silwan, the village south of the city blamed for
the attack, although he did note that a suspect died “falling over a cliff.”35 In
Ha’Aretz (the Land) it was reported how after tracker dogs led the authorities
to the village, a villager was hospitalized after falling off a cliff, while soldiers
shot dead one man and wounded another. The authorities then sealed the
village, forbidding villagers to leave without a permit and requiring all males
to report every evening to the police. The village was also forced to pay for a
twenty-man police post.36 More graphic accounts of what happened in Silwan
are to be found in the private papers of soldiers present at the scene. A North
Staffordshire Regiment officer recorded in his diary that Black Watch men beat
twelve Arabs to death in Silwan with rifle butts.37 The assailants had appar-
ently left the two dead soldiers face down with their kilts raised and buttocks
exposed, further enraging their comrades: “An insult the local Arabs suffered
for.”38 Another British officer recalled that the “Jocks” (slang for the Scottish)
were uncontrollable after their comrades’ deaths and so the high command
gave them eight hours to “search” Silwan without rifles: “a lot of Arabs were
very sorry that it had happened.”39
village searches and less formal versions of events suggest a hidden history—
when evidence can be found. The British response to the assassination of two
Black Watch Regiment soldiers near Jerusalem’s Jaffa Gate on 5 November
1937 is a case in point. In what would be classed as an “official” account,
General Sir Archibald Wavell, the overall commander in Palestine, remarked on
the restraint shown by the Black Watch (coincidentally, his old regiment) on a
subsequent operation against Silwan, the village south of the city blamed for
the attack, although he did note that a suspect died “falling over a cliff.”35 In
Ha’Aretz (the Land) it was reported how after tracker dogs led the authorities
to the village, a villager was hospitalized after falling off a cliff, while soldiers
shot dead one man and wounded another. The authorities then sealed the
village, forbidding villagers to leave without a permit and requiring all males
to report every evening to the police. The village was also forced to pay for a
twenty-man police post.36 More graphic accounts of what happened in Silwan
are to be found in the private papers of soldiers present at the scene. A North
Staffordshire Regiment officer recorded in his diary that Black Watch men beat
twelve Arabs to death in Silwan with rifle butts.37 The assailants had appar-
ently left the two dead soldiers face down with their kilts raised and buttocks
exposed, further enraging their comrades: “An insult the local Arabs suffered
for.”38 Another British officer recalled that the “Jocks” (slang for the Scottish)
were uncontrollable after their comrades’ deaths and so the high command
gave them eight hours to “search” Silwan without rifles: “a lot of Arabs were
very sorry that it had happened.”39
Arab sources also provide information
about the conduct of soldiers. For
example, in June 1936 Muslim religious leaders wrote to the high commissioner
example, in June 1936 Muslim religious leaders wrote to the high commissioner
13
detailing how police officers on operations “stamped” on things, “smashed
doors, mirrors, tables, chairs, wardrobes, glass, porcelain,” and ripped women’s
clothing and bed linen. Soldiers mixed in margarine and oil with foodstuffs,
trampled on “holy books,” and destroyed wooden kitchen utensils as well as
glasses, clocks, smoking pipes, and basins.40 That same month, the Arab Higher
Committee, the Palestinians’ supreme leadership, protested to the high com-
missioner about police and soldiers hitting innocent people; insulting their
dignity; stealing items; and destroying furniture, goods, and provisions.41 Bahjat
Abu Gharbiyah, a Palestinian rebel, gunman, and journalist during the revolt,
wrote in his memoirs how servicemen “searched houses, each one by itself, in
a way that was sabotaging on purpose”:
doors, mirrors, tables, chairs, wardrobes, glass, porcelain,” and ripped women’s
clothing and bed linen. Soldiers mixed in margarine and oil with foodstuffs,
trampled on “holy books,” and destroyed wooden kitchen utensils as well as
glasses, clocks, smoking pipes, and basins.40 That same month, the Arab Higher
Committee, the Palestinians’ supreme leadership, protested to the high com-
missioner about police and soldiers hitting innocent people; insulting their
dignity; stealing items; and destroying furniture, goods, and provisions.41 Bahjat
Abu Gharbiyah, a Palestinian rebel, gunman, and journalist during the revolt,
wrote in his memoirs how servicemen “searched houses, each one by itself, in
a way that was sabotaging on purpose”:
[T]hey looted some of the assets of the houses, and burnt some other houses, and destroyed provisions/goods. After putting flour, wheat, rice,
sugar and others together, they
added all the olive oil or petrol they could find. And in every search
operation they destroyed a number of houses of the village and damaged others. They also put signs on other houses to destroy them in the future if there are any incidents near the village, even if that incident is only cutting telephone wires.42
operation they destroyed a number of houses of the village and damaged others. They also put signs on other houses to destroy them in the future if there are any incidents near the village, even if that incident is only cutting telephone wires.42
Arab villagers were trapped between
the hammer of rebel operations and
the anvil of British forces.43 In one typical example, when the police went
to investigate a report that rebels had blocked the road near the village of
Shafa ‘Amr with trenches and roadblocks, the “local inhabitants protested that
they had been compelled to do this sabotage by rebel gangs, but this excuse
did not spare them from a fine of £[P]700 [Palestine pounds],” and they had
to repair the road.44 The collective fines imposed were a heavy burden for
Palestinian villagers, especially when the authorities also took away all their
livestock, smashed up properties, imposed long curfews, set up police posts,
blew up houses, and detained some or all of the menfolk in distant deten-
tion camps. Fines varied but could be as high as £P5,000 and they had to be
paid promptly in cash or in the form of produce such as animals, eggs, and
cereals.45 To make matters worse, the rebels also fined or robbed villages for
not supporting the revolt, £P1,000 in one case, £P10-100 per household in
another.46 To give a sense of the magnitude of the fines, in the late 1930s a
British police officer of constable rank earned a basic pay of £P11 per month
rising to £P18 for an assistant inspector “all found,” a wage that drew police
recruits to Palestine. By contrast, Rosemary Sayigh has estimated the average
yearly wage of a Palestinian rural family at between £P25-30.47 In the village
of al-Tira (or Taybeh; the transliteration from Arabic to Hebrew to English is
not clear), peasants responded to a fine of £P2,000 by picking up what they
could carry and leaving.48
the anvil of British forces.43 In one typical example, when the police went
to investigate a report that rebels had blocked the road near the village of
Shafa ‘Amr with trenches and roadblocks, the “local inhabitants protested that
they had been compelled to do this sabotage by rebel gangs, but this excuse
did not spare them from a fine of £[P]700 [Palestine pounds],” and they had
to repair the road.44 The collective fines imposed were a heavy burden for
Palestinian villagers, especially when the authorities also took away all their
livestock, smashed up properties, imposed long curfews, set up police posts,
blew up houses, and detained some or all of the menfolk in distant deten-
tion camps. Fines varied but could be as high as £P5,000 and they had to be
paid promptly in cash or in the form of produce such as animals, eggs, and
cereals.45 To make matters worse, the rebels also fined or robbed villages for
not supporting the revolt, £P1,000 in one case, £P10-100 per household in
another.46 To give a sense of the magnitude of the fines, in the late 1930s a
British police officer of constable rank earned a basic pay of £P11 per month
rising to £P18 for an assistant inspector “all found,” a wage that drew police
recruits to Palestine. By contrast, Rosemary Sayigh has estimated the average
yearly wage of a Palestinian rural family at between £P25-30.47 In the village
of al-Tira (or Taybeh; the transliteration from Arabic to Hebrew to English is
not clear), peasants responded to a fine of £P2,000 by picking up what they
could carry and leaving.48
If villagers were unable to pay
collective fines in currency, they paid in
produce: “As usual police were called to do the dirty work, collecting chickens,
produce: “As usual police were called to do the dirty work, collecting chickens,
14
eggs and grain from each family and taking
them to Haifa for sale.”49 Police
activity often went beyond the forced requisitioning of produce, as when
the police went to a village after rebels had killed some “wogs” and promptly
indulged in indiscriminate violence against the villagers rather than the rebels.
“By the time we arrived of course they had vanished into the blue but we had
orders to decimate the whole place which we did, all animals and grain and
food were destroyed and the sheikh and all his hangers on beaten up with rifle
butts. There will be quite a number of funerals their [sic] I should imagine.”50
Villagers were in permanent debt as their mukhtars (headmen) attempted to
gather official fines from their penniless and hungry villagers. Certain villagers
were also required to produce bonds of up to £P100 and additional sureties to
ensure their good behavior. Failure to pay could result in imprisonment.51
activity often went beyond the forced requisitioning of produce, as when
the police went to a village after rebels had killed some “wogs” and promptly
indulged in indiscriminate violence against the villagers rather than the rebels.
“By the time we arrived of course they had vanished into the blue but we had
orders to decimate the whole place which we did, all animals and grain and
food were destroyed and the sheikh and all his hangers on beaten up with rifle
butts. There will be quite a number of funerals their [sic] I should imagine.”50
Villagers were in permanent debt as their mukhtars (headmen) attempted to
gather official fines from their penniless and hungry villagers. Certain villagers
were also required to produce bonds of up to £P100 and additional sureties to
ensure their good behavior. Failure to pay could result in imprisonment.51
The British ratcheted up their
punitive actions, especially after September
1937. When on 18 February 1938 rebels ambushed a car twelve miles south
of Haifa, killing an RAF officer and badly wounding a British woman passenger
near the “bad” village of Ijzim (“good” and “bad” villages are recurring terms in
British files), the authorities brought in a tracker dog to pick up the scent:
1937. When on 18 February 1938 rebels ambushed a car twelve miles south
of Haifa, killing an RAF officer and badly wounding a British woman passenger
near the “bad” village of Ijzim (“good” and “bad” villages are recurring terms in
British files), the authorities brought in a tracker dog to pick up the scent:
The trail was expected to lead up the Wadi
Mughar to the bad village of Igzim [Ijzim in literary Arabic], and B Company, less one platoon, under Major Clay was detailed as dog escort.
The fourth platoon was given the task of rounding up 2,300 goats and 200 sheep for confiscation as a punishment on the inhabitants of the area in which the crime was committed.
The dog quickly took up the trail and moved up the Wadi Mughar to Igzim, where it “marked” a house on the northern end of the village. It was then taken back to the coast road and put onto another clue, again tracking back to the same village, but to a house opposite the first one. When searched, however, the owners of both houses were absent. The whole village was then cordoned and searched, while reports were sent to Brigade Headquarters in Haifa on the result of the dog’s tracking. Later in the morning orders were received to demolish the two houses marked by the dogs.52
The fourth platoon was given the task of rounding up 2,300 goats and 200 sheep for confiscation as a punishment on the inhabitants of the area in which the crime was committed.
The dog quickly took up the trail and moved up the Wadi Mughar to Igzim, where it “marked” a house on the northern end of the village. It was then taken back to the coast road and put onto another clue, again tracking back to the same village, but to a house opposite the first one. When searched, however, the owners of both houses were absent. The whole village was then cordoned and searched, while reports were sent to Brigade Headquarters in Haifa on the result of the dog’s tracking. Later in the morning orders were received to demolish the two houses marked by the dogs.52
A policeman present at Ijzim, Sydney Burr,
wrote to his parents about the brutality of the “search,” which was so harsh as to prompt a complaint
about army behavior from the Anglican Mission in Palestine.53
The use of Doberman tracker dogs,
specially imported from South Africa,
gave a spurious exactitude to an operational method that relied on villagers
doing the work of the British army, suppressing the rebels on pain of the col-
lective punishment and reprisals that would inevitably ensue if there were any
rebel actions in the area. Critics alleged that tracker dogs always picked out
some suspect on parade; on one occasion after a robbery, the dog followed
a scent to a distant village, leading the police to an old blind man and then
barked at him, “proving” that he was the robber.54 Once the tracker dog had
gave a spurious exactitude to an operational method that relied on villagers
doing the work of the British army, suppressing the rebels on pain of the col-
lective punishment and reprisals that would inevitably ensue if there were any
rebel actions in the area. Critics alleged that tracker dogs always picked out
some suspect on parade; on one occasion after a robbery, the dog followed
a scent to a distant village, leading the police to an old blind man and then
barked at him, “proving” that he was the robber.54 Once the tracker dog had
15
marked a Palestinian or a dwelling, the police
invariably “found” some bullets to confirm guilt and the courts then
took over, with hanging the ultimate penalty for the possession of even one
round.
UNOFFICIAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE
Excepting the endemic problem of
soldiers stealing and taking “souvenirs”
during searches—which even periodic personal searches of men by noncom-
missioned officers under officers’ orders failed to stop—the actions described
in the previous section were within the law and (generally) acceptable under
British military rule.55 They formed part of the official policies designed to
break the resolve of the Palestinian peasantry. But there were also unofficial
acts of brutality committed by rank-and-file servicemen that were not permit-
ted, stretching beyond “official” collective punishment and fines to include
much more violent acts directed not only at property but also at individuals.
While these ad hoc outrages were often soldiers’ revenge against rebel attacks,
they also had the unintended effect of helping the suppression of the revolt by
further terrorizing ordinary Palestinian civilians (and rebel fighters). Officers
operating in the field seem to have accepted or even sanctioned a level of casual
brutality by their men. Some level of personal pleasure in causing suffering also
played its part. As the commanding officer of the Essex Regiment—a unit that
acted very brutally in Ireland in the early 1920s—noted at the end of 1937, puni-
tive search operations against Arab villages were “enjoyed by all ranks.”56
during searches—which even periodic personal searches of men by noncom-
missioned officers under officers’ orders failed to stop—the actions described
in the previous section were within the law and (generally) acceptable under
British military rule.55 They formed part of the official policies designed to
break the resolve of the Palestinian peasantry. But there were also unofficial
acts of brutality committed by rank-and-file servicemen that were not permit-
ted, stretching beyond “official” collective punishment and fines to include
much more violent acts directed not only at property but also at individuals.
While these ad hoc outrages were often soldiers’ revenge against rebel attacks,
they also had the unintended effect of helping the suppression of the revolt by
further terrorizing ordinary Palestinian civilians (and rebel fighters). Officers
operating in the field seem to have accepted or even sanctioned a level of casual
brutality by their men. Some level of personal pleasure in causing suffering also
played its part. As the commanding officer of the Essex Regiment—a unit that
acted very brutally in Ireland in the early 1920s—noted at the end of 1937, puni-
tive search operations against Arab villages were “enjoyed by all ranks.”56
A common unofficial British army
practice was to make local Arabs ride
with military convoys to prevent mine attacks. Soldiers carried them or tied
them to the bonnets of lorries or put the hostages on small flatbeds at the
front of trains, all to prevent mining or sniper attacks. “The naughty boys who
we had in the cages in these camps” were put in vehicles in front of the
convoy for the “deterrent effect,” as one British officer put it.57 The army told
the Arabs that they would shoot anyone who tried to run away.58 Soldiers
would brake hard at the end of a journey and then casually drive over the Arab
who had tumbled from the bonnet, killing or maiming him. As Arthur Lane, a
Manchester Regiment private, later candidly recalled in an oral interview:
with military convoys to prevent mine attacks. Soldiers carried them or tied
them to the bonnets of lorries or put the hostages on small flatbeds at the
front of trains, all to prevent mining or sniper attacks. “The naughty boys who
we had in the cages in these camps” were put in vehicles in front of the
convoy for the “deterrent effect,” as one British officer put it.57 The army told
the Arabs that they would shoot anyone who tried to run away.58 Soldiers
would brake hard at the end of a journey and then casually drive over the Arab
who had tumbled from the bonnet, killing or maiming him. As Arthur Lane, a
Manchester Regiment private, later candidly recalled in an oral interview:
[W]hen you’d finished your duty you would come
away nothing had happened no bombs or anything and the driver would switch his wheel back and to make the truck waver and the poor wog on the front would roll off into the deck. Well if he
was lucky he’d get away with a broken leg but if he was unlucky the truck behind coming up behind would hit him. But nobody bothered to pick up the bits they were left. You know we were there we were the masters we were the bosses and whatever we did was right. . . . Well you know you don’t want him anymore.
He’s fulfilled his job. And that’s when Bill Usher [the commanding officer] said that it had to stop because before long they’d be running out of bloody rebels to sit on the bonnet.59
was lucky he’d get away with a broken leg but if he was unlucky the truck behind coming up behind would hit him. But nobody bothered to pick up the bits they were left. You know we were there we were the masters we were the bosses and whatever we did was right. . . . Well you know you don’t want him anymore.
He’s fulfilled his job. And that’s when Bill Usher [the commanding officer] said that it had to stop because before long they’d be running out of bloody rebels to sit on the bonnet.59
16
British troops also left Arabs
wounded on the battlefield to die60 and maltreated Arab fighters taken in battle, so much so that the rebels tried
to remove their wounded or dead from the field of battle.61 Lane, the
soldier with the Manchester Regiment, was in a clash with guerrillas in which several
British soldiers had been killed and he provides a graphic, disturbing account of
what happened to the Arabs captured after a firefight who were taken back to
the military camp and tied to a post:
[T]hey were in a state and they were really
knocked about. . .
whoever had done it when they got them on the wagons to bring them back to camp the lads had beat them up, set about them . . . [the interviewer asks him with what] . . . Anything.
Anything they could find. Rifle butts, bayonets, scabbard bayonets, fists, boots, whatever. There was one poor sod there he was I would imagine my age actually and I’d heard people say in the past that you could take your eye out and have it
cleaned and put it back and I always believed it but it’s not so because this lad’s eye was hanging down on his lip, on his cheek. The whole eye had been knocked out and it was hanging down and there was blood dripping on his face.
whoever had done it when they got them on the wagons to bring them back to camp the lads had beat them up, set about them . . . [the interviewer asks him with what] . . . Anything.
Anything they could find. Rifle butts, bayonets, scabbard bayonets, fists, boots, whatever. There was one poor sod there he was I would imagine my age actually and I’d heard people say in the past that you could take your eye out and have it
cleaned and put it back and I always believed it but it’s not so because this lad’s eye was hanging down on his lip, on his cheek. The whole eye had been knocked out and it was hanging down and there was blood dripping on his face.
When asked why the soldiers had done this,
Lane replied simply, “Same as any
soldier. I don’t care whether he’s English, German, Japanese or what. He’s the
victor he’s the boss and you accept the treatment that he gives you. I don’t
care what you say. . . . There’s a beast in every man I don’t care who he is. You
soldier. I don’t care whether he’s English, German, Japanese or what. He’s the
victor he’s the boss and you accept the treatment that he gives you. I don’t
care what you say. . . . There’s a beast in every man I don’t care who he is. You
can say the biggest queen or queer that you
come across but there’s a beast in
him somewhere and in a situation like that it comes out.”62
These excesses were soldiers’ responses to rebels wounding or killing com-
rades in battles, with prisoners or local villagers being convenient targets for
revenge attacks.63 British soldiers also bayoneted innocent Arabs64 and gunned
down Arab fighters en masse as they came out to surrender near Jenin:
him somewhere and in a situation like that it comes out.”62
These excesses were soldiers’ responses to rebels wounding or killing com-
rades in battles, with prisoners or local villagers being convenient targets for
revenge attacks.63 British soldiers also bayoneted innocent Arabs64 and gunned
down Arab fighters en masse as they came out to surrender near Jenin:
At one time the Ulsters and West Kents caught
about 60 of them [Arab guerrillas] in a valley and as they walked out with their arms up mowed them down with machine guns.
I inspected them afterwards and most of them were boys between 16 and 20 from Syria. . . . No news of course is given to the newspapers, so what you read in the papers is just enough to allay public uneasiness in England.65
I inspected them afterwards and most of them were boys between 16 and 20 from Syria. . . . No news of course is given to the newspapers, so what you read in the papers is just enough to allay public uneasiness in England.65
There is also the question of the methods used
by Orde Wingate’s “Special Night Squads”
that mixed British servicemen with Jewish fighters and pitted them against the
Arabs in Galilee—“extreme and cruel”
noted one colonial official, Hugh Foot, a force that tortured,
whipped, executed, and abused Arabs according to Jewish sources.66
The brutality of the Palestine police
and prison service had some official
sanction. Frances Newton, a British resident of Haifa sympathetic to the Arabs
sanction. Frances Newton, a British resident of Haifa sympathetic to the Arabs
17
(and eventually banned from the country),
noted that after the murder of
the assistant district commissioner Lewis Andrews in September 1937 by
Arab gunmen, the police asked permission to use torture to extract informa-
tion from suspects, which the Colonial Office granted. “Several of the leading
police officers in Jerusalem refused to countenance it. One of them has since
left the country.”67
the assistant district commissioner Lewis Andrews in September 1937 by
Arab gunmen, the police asked permission to use torture to extract informa-
tion from suspects, which the Colonial Office granted. “Several of the leading
police officers in Jerusalem refused to countenance it. One of them has since
left the country.”67
Tegart, the senior officer mentioned above, who had been brought in to
Palestine from the India police, established torture centers, known euphemis-
tically as “Arab Investigation Centers,” where suspects got the “third degree”
until they “spilled the beans.” A major such center in a Jewish quarter of West
Jerusalem was closed only after colonial officials including District Commissioner
Edward Keith-Roach complained to the high commissioner.68 The British army
divisional commander in Palestine, Sir Richard O’Connor, also wrote of the use
of the “third degree” and “black and tan methods” (oft-used phrases), the latter
a reference to the British paramilitary unit known as the “Black and Tans” that
operated against Irish rebels in Ireland’s war of independence.69 In an interview
with this author, Abu Gharbiyah stated that torture ended only after the issue
was discussed in Britain’s Parliament.70 Interrogators used the “waterboarding”
torture at these centers.71 Keith-Roach raised the issue that the “questionable
practises” carried out by Criminal Investigation Department officers on suspects
were counterproductive, both in terms of the information gathered and the
effect that they had on local people’s confidence in the police.72
Palestine from the India police, established torture centers, known euphemis-
tically as “Arab Investigation Centers,” where suspects got the “third degree”
until they “spilled the beans.” A major such center in a Jewish quarter of West
Jerusalem was closed only after colonial officials including District Commissioner
Edward Keith-Roach complained to the high commissioner.68 The British army
divisional commander in Palestine, Sir Richard O’Connor, also wrote of the use
of the “third degree” and “black and tan methods” (oft-used phrases), the latter
a reference to the British paramilitary unit known as the “Black and Tans” that
operated against Irish rebels in Ireland’s war of independence.69 In an interview
with this author, Abu Gharbiyah stated that torture ended only after the issue
was discussed in Britain’s Parliament.70 Interrogators used the “waterboarding”
torture at these centers.71 Keith-Roach raised the issue that the “questionable
practises” carried out by Criminal Investigation Department officers on suspects
were counterproductive, both in terms of the information gathered and the
effect that they had on local people’s confidence in the police.72
Accounts in both Arabic and English
also detail torture—of Arabs being
blown to bits in vehicles after being forced along roads in which the British
had placed mines; of British operatives placing “terrorist” bombs in Haifa; of
detainees being left in open cages in the sun without sustenance; of men
being beaten with wet ropes, “boxed,” and having their teeth smashed; and
of men having their feet burnt with oil.73 Those who were “boxed” were
blown to bits in vehicles after being forced along roads in which the British
had placed mines; of British operatives placing “terrorist” bombs in Haifa; of
detainees being left in open cages in the sun without sustenance; of men
being beaten with wet ropes, “boxed,” and having their teeth smashed; and
of men having their feet burnt with oil.73 Those who were “boxed” were
beaten until
knocked unconscious, “needles” were
Guards used bayonets on sleep-deprived Arab detainees and made them
wear
bells around their necks and
then dance.
used on
suspects, dogs were set upon Arab detainees, and British and Jewish auxiliary forces
maltreated Arabs by having them hold heavy stones and then
beating them when they dropped them. Guards also used bayonets on sleep-deprived men and made them wear bells around their necks and then dance.74 Arab
by guards in petitions made through the Anglican Mission. Prisoners
jumped
to their deaths from high windows to escape their captors, had their testicles
tied with cord, were tortured with strips of wood studded with nails, had
wire tightened around their big toes, and hair was torn from their faces and
heads. Special instruments were used to pull out fingernails, red-hot skew-
ers were used on detainees, prisoners were sodomized, and boiling oil was
used on them, as were intoxicants (morphine, cocaine, and heroin). There
were also electric shocks, water funneled into suspects’ stomachs, and mock
executions.75
to their deaths from high windows to escape their captors, had their testicles
tied with cord, were tortured with strips of wood studded with nails, had
wire tightened around their big toes, and hair was torn from their faces and
heads. Special instruments were used to pull out fingernails, red-hot skew-
ers were used on detainees, prisoners were sodomized, and boiling oil was
used on them, as were intoxicants (morphine, cocaine, and heroin). There
were also electric shocks, water funneled into suspects’ stomachs, and mock
executions.75
18
At least two outrages by British
forces in Palestine meet the dictionary defi-
nition of an atrocity and suggest an “official” military operational method of
destruction that could get out of hand and descend into “unofficial” violence.
These two incidents, for which there is enough evidence to permit a reason-
ably full reconstruction, occurred at al-Bassa, a village in Acre district near the
Lebanese border, in September 1938, and at Halhul, a village near Hebron, in
May 1939.76 In the case of al-Bassa, soldiers retaliated against the village after
four of their comrades were killed in its vicinity by a rebel land mine. The
logic was that when Arab insurgents laid a mine they informed nearby vil-
lages of its placement, making the local villagers responsible. In fact, a policy
of retaliation in such cases fitted in with the collective responsibility detailed
above and at the same time discouraged further rebel attacks. Within twenty-
four hours, al-Bassa was burned to the ground and at least twenty villagers
were herded onto a bus that was forced to drive over a land mine buried by
the soldiers, after which other villagers were forced to dig a pit and bury the
bodies.77 As for Halhul—one of the villages designated as “bad” by the British
for its rebel sympathies—the brutal treatment meted out was the result of the
army’s attempt to extract intelligence from the villagers on the whereabouts
of weapons caches. While brutality was not uncommon in attempts to obtain
information, in this case some fifteen elderly male villagers—all of whom had
been herded into cages and left out in the open in intense heat for days with
inadequate water—died of thirst and exposure. Halhul and al-Bassa were not
isolated incidents. The Anglican Mission in Jerusalem listed twenty-two villages
and towns in which troops inflicted single or multiple outrages, sometimes
over a period of months.78
nition of an atrocity and suggest an “official” military operational method of
destruction that could get out of hand and descend into “unofficial” violence.
These two incidents, for which there is enough evidence to permit a reason-
ably full reconstruction, occurred at al-Bassa, a village in Acre district near the
Lebanese border, in September 1938, and at Halhul, a village near Hebron, in
May 1939.76 In the case of al-Bassa, soldiers retaliated against the village after
four of their comrades were killed in its vicinity by a rebel land mine. The
logic was that when Arab insurgents laid a mine they informed nearby vil-
lages of its placement, making the local villagers responsible. In fact, a policy
of retaliation in such cases fitted in with the collective responsibility detailed
above and at the same time discouraged further rebel attacks. Within twenty-
four hours, al-Bassa was burned to the ground and at least twenty villagers
were herded onto a bus that was forced to drive over a land mine buried by
the soldiers, after which other villagers were forced to dig a pit and bury the
bodies.77 As for Halhul—one of the villages designated as “bad” by the British
for its rebel sympathies—the brutal treatment meted out was the result of the
army’s attempt to extract intelligence from the villagers on the whereabouts
of weapons caches. While brutality was not uncommon in attempts to obtain
information, in this case some fifteen elderly male villagers—all of whom had
been herded into cages and left out in the open in intense heat for days with
inadequate water—died of thirst and exposure. Halhul and al-Bassa were not
isolated incidents. The Anglican Mission in Jerusalem listed twenty-two villages
and towns in which troops inflicted single or multiple outrages, sometimes
over a period of months.78
CONCLUSION
In surveying British military law and
operational methods in Palestine in the late 1930s, it is clear that embedded in the official “system” of repression
was a targeting of Palestinian civilians that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It is not clear which came first: the (often) brutal operational methods or the laws and collective ideas, traditions, and norms that validated them—not surprising when one considers the traditional British preference for flexible practice over codified theory.
was a targeting of Palestinian civilians that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It is not clear which came first: the (often) brutal operational methods or the laws and collective ideas, traditions, and norms that validated them—not surprising when one considers the traditional British preference for flexible practice over codified theory.
Troops in Palestine used force across
a spectrum: not so much minimum force as necessary force and, at times, excessive force, which itself was
often
“necessary” to secure Britain’s objective of defeating the rebels by targeting their civilian support base. That said, the Colonial Office, the high commissioner, and civilian sensibilities generally helped to establish “red lines” that the security forces could not cross. Moreover, the humanist tendencies of some servicemen countered the hawkishness of others. The army was pulled in
different directions, being asked to repress the Palestinians quickly to free up forces for a possible war in Europe, but without too much “frightfulness.” The
British high command tolerated the less blatant abuses committed by its men
“necessary” to secure Britain’s objective of defeating the rebels by targeting their civilian support base. That said, the Colonial Office, the high commissioner, and civilian sensibilities generally helped to establish “red lines” that the security forces could not cross. Moreover, the humanist tendencies of some servicemen countered the hawkishness of others. The army was pulled in
different directions, being asked to repress the Palestinians quickly to free up forces for a possible war in Europe, but without too much “frightfulness.” The
British high command tolerated the less blatant abuses committed by its men
based in
Haifa and Jerusalem were sensitive to charges of abuse, politically if not morally, and so it was junior
officers in the field who were intimately involved in any excesses. The Anglican bishop
in Jerusalem put it succinctly, writing how outrages “are not officially
sanctioned although they have not been officially regretted.”79 The result was
a tension between violence and moderation in the British system; the police and
army behaved differently, and many officials opposed the violence.
Given these competing and conflicting
demands, British officers compared their position unfavorably to other European countries that were much
harsher in suppressing colonial revolts. General Wavell, the senior British military
commander in Palestine at the time, remarked to a colleague, “If the Germans were in occupation in Haifa we’d not have any bloody trouble from the Arabs.”80 In some comparative sense, Wavell was right, though such a perspective
smacks of an apology for the military power on which empires depend.
NOTES
1. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their
Principles and Practices (London: HMSO, 1906), p. 145.
2. Callwell, Small Wars, p. 148.
3. Callwell, Small Wars, p. 148.
4. Charles Gwynn, Imperial Policing (London: Macmillan, 1934); H. J. Simson, British Rule and Rebellion (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1937).
5. War Office, Issued by Command of the Army Council, Manual of Military Law, 1929 (London: HMSO, 1929); War
Office, By Command of the Army Council,
Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934
(London: War Office, 30 January 1934); War Office, By Command of the Army Council, 5 August 1937, Duties in the Aid of the Civil Power (London: War Office, 1937).
6. War Office, Manual of Military Law, p. 103.
7. War Office, Manual of Military Law, p. 343; War Office, Notes on Imperial Policing, pp. 12, 39-41.
8. War Office, Manual of Military Law, p. 255.
9. Norman Bentwich, ed., Legislation of Palestine 1918-25, vol. 1 (Whitehead: Government of Palestine, 1926), pp.
246-49.
10. The Tiger and the Rose: A Monthly Journal of the York and Lancaster Regiment 13, no. 16 (October 1936), p. 390.
11. Diary, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, pp. 6, 74-75, 78ff, 105, Middle East
Centre [MEC], St. Antony’s College, Oxford;
Manshiya Exploits by the Three British Policemen in Mufti during the Night of the 23-24 Oct. 1938, in J & E Mission
papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 2, MEC; J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 5, MEC.
12. “Palestine: Martial Law Order Issued,” Palestine Post, 30 September 1936.
13. Simson, British Rule, pp. 96ff, 103.
14. Essex Regiment Gazette 6, no. 46 (March 1938), p. 282.
14. Essex Regiment Gazette 6, no. 46 (March 1938), p. 282.
15. Letter, Burr to Parents, 24 February 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, Imperial War Museum Documents [IWMD], London; The Disturbances of 1936—Cause and Effect (General Political No. 5), U.S. Consulate General to State Department, 6 June 1936, signed Leland Morris, U.S. Consul General, 867N.00/311, p. 8, National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park.
16. Abdel Rahman, “British Policy Towards the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39” (PhD thesis, University of London, 1971), pp. 140-42; Yuval Arnon-Ohanna, Falahim ba-Mered ha-Aravi be-Eretz Israel, 1936-39 [The Felaheen during the Arab Revolt in the Land of Israel] (Tel Aviv: University Press, 1978), p. 33; Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-Nidal al-‘Arabi al-Filastini: Mudhakkarat al-Munadil Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah
16. Abdel Rahman, “British Policy Towards the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39” (PhD thesis, University of London, 1971), pp. 140-42; Yuval Arnon-Ohanna, Falahim ba-Mered ha-Aravi be-Eretz Israel, 1936-39 [The Felaheen during the Arab Revolt in the Land of Israel] (Tel Aviv: University Press, 1978), p. 33; Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-Nidal al-‘Arabi al-Filastini: Mudhakkarat al-Munadil Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah
[In the Midst of the Struggle for the Arab Palestinian Cause: The Memoirs of Freedom Fighter Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah]
20
(Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies [IPS], 1993), pp. 60-61; al-Difa‘, 17 June 1936; The Wasp: The Journal of the 16th Foot 8, no. 5 (March 1937), p. 267; John Newsinger, The Blood Never Dried (London:
Bookmarks, 2002), pp. 131ff.
17. Al-Difa‘, 17 June and 23 July 1936; Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-Nidal, pp. 60-61.
18. Filastin, 19 June 1936.
19. “Pieces of War,” Typed Memoir,
Simonds papers, 08/46/1, p. 149, IWMD.
20. The Arabs with glee printed up
10,000 copies of the court’s critical conclu-
sions for public distribution. Edward Keith-
Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate (London: Radcliffe, 1994), p. 185;
Y. Eyal, Ha-Intifada ha-Rishona: Dikuy ha-Mered ha-Aravi al yedey ha-Tzava ha-Briti be-Eretz Israel, 1936-39 [The First Intifada: The Suppression of the Arab Revolt by the British Army, 1936-39] (Tel Aviv:
Ma’arahot, 1998), p. 110; Walid Khalidi and Yassin Suweyd, Al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya wa al-Khatar al-Sahyuni [The Palestinian Problem and the Zionist Danger] (Beirut: IPS, 1973), p. 234.
Simonds papers, 08/46/1, p. 149, IWMD.
20. The Arabs with glee printed up
10,000 copies of the court’s critical conclu-
sions for public distribution. Edward Keith-
Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem: Memoirs of a District Commissioner under the British Mandate (London: Radcliffe, 1994), p. 185;
Y. Eyal, Ha-Intifada ha-Rishona: Dikuy ha-Mered ha-Aravi al yedey ha-Tzava ha-Briti be-Eretz Israel, 1936-39 [The First Intifada: The Suppression of the Arab Revolt by the British Army, 1936-39] (Tel Aviv:
Ma’arahot, 1998), p. 110; Walid Khalidi and Yassin Suweyd, Al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya wa al-Khatar al-Sahyuni [The Palestinian Problem and the Zionist Danger] (Beirut: IPS, 1973), p. 234.
21. Filastin, 19 June 1936. See also, Mustafa Kabha, The Palestine Press as Shaper of Opinion, 1928-39: Writing up a Storm (Ilford: Vallentine Mitchell, 2006).
22. Al-Difa‘, 17 June and 23 July 1936.
23. Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-Nidal, p. 59.
22. Al-Difa‘, 17 June and 23 July 1936.
23. Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-Nidal, p. 59.
24. Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle for the Holy Land, 1935-48 (London: Futura, 1980), p. 49; W. V. Palmer, “The Second Battalion in Palestine,” in H. D. Chaplin, ed., The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment
(London: Michael Joseph, 1954), p. 102.
25. Letter, Burr to Parents, 9 Sept. 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
25. Letter, Burr to Parents, 9 Sept. 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
26. Monthly News Letter No. 2, 2nd Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment, 1-30 September 1936 in Abdul-Latif al-Tibawi papers, GB 165-1284, MEC.
27. For village searches, see H. M.
Wilson, Diary of School Year in Palestine, 1938-39, about 31,000 words, Wilson papers, GB 165-0302, pp. 36ff, MEC; see also the correspondence and pictures in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 3, MEC.
28. D. Scott Daniell, The Royal
Hampshire Regiment, vol. 3 (Aldershot: Gale, 1955), p. 34.
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
29. “Palestine: The First Intifada,” Timewatch, BBC, 27 March 1991.
30. Fred Howbrook, 4619, p. 2, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive [IWMSA], London.
30. Fred Howbrook, 4619, p. 2, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive [IWMSA], London.
31. J. S. S. Gratton, 4506, pp. 14-15, IWMSA.
32. Diary, 22 January 1938, Tegart papers, GB 165-0281, Box 4, MEC.
33. Maj. Gen. H. E. N. Bredin, 4550, p.
10, IWMSA.
33. Maj. Gen. H. E. N. Bredin, 4550, p.
10, IWMSA.
34. Diary, Wilson papers, GB 165-0302, pp. 28-29, MEC.
35. John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London: Collins, 1964), p. 194; Eric and Andro Linklater, The Black Watch (London: Barrie, 1977), p. 175.
36. Ha’Aretz, 7-8 November 1937.
37. Maj. White, Diary, 7 November 1937, Relating to Service in Palestine, 1974-04-24-8, National Army Museum, London.
37. Maj. White, Diary, 7 November 1937, Relating to Service in Palestine, 1974-04-24-8, National Army Museum, London.
38. Correspondence, Edward Horne (formerly of the Palestine police) to author, 5 September 2009.
39. “Pieces of War,” Typed Memoir,
Simonds papers, 08/46/1, p. 148, IWMD.
40. Memorandum of Protest from
the Religious Scholars to the High
Commissioner about the Police Aggression
against Mosques and Houses, 1 June 1936,
in Akram Zua‘ytir, Watha’iq al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya, 1918-39: Min Awraq Akram Zua‘ytir [Documents of the Palestinian National Movement, 1918-39: From the Papers of Akram
Zua‘ytir] (Beirut: IPS, 1979), p. 436.
41. Memorandum of the Arab Higher Committee to the High Commissioner to
Protest on the Laws and the Behaviour of the Authorities, Jaffa, 22 June 1936 in A. W. Kayyali, Watha’iq al-Muqawama al-Filas-tiniyya al-‘Arabiyya Didd al-Ihtilal al-Baritani wa al-Sahyuniyya [Documents of the Palestinian Arab Resistance] (Beirut: IPS, 1968), pp. 407-11.
Simonds papers, 08/46/1, p. 148, IWMD.
40. Memorandum of Protest from
the Religious Scholars to the High
Commissioner about the Police Aggression
against Mosques and Houses, 1 June 1936,
in Akram Zua‘ytir, Watha’iq al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya, 1918-39: Min Awraq Akram Zua‘ytir [Documents of the Palestinian National Movement, 1918-39: From the Papers of Akram
Zua‘ytir] (Beirut: IPS, 1979), p. 436.
41. Memorandum of the Arab Higher Committee to the High Commissioner to
Protest on the Laws and the Behaviour of the Authorities, Jaffa, 22 June 1936 in A. W. Kayyali, Watha’iq al-Muqawama al-Filas-tiniyya al-‘Arabiyya Didd al-Ihtilal al-Baritani wa al-Sahyuniyya [Documents of the Palestinian Arab Resistance] (Beirut: IPS, 1968), pp. 407-11.
42. Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-Nidal, p. 60.
43. Report dated 5 May 1939, 10 pages in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, p. 3, MEC.
44. Palmer, “Second Battalion,” p. 100. £P1 equalled £1 U.K. sterling.
45. Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-Nidal, pp. 60-61; Ha’Aretz (Evening Issue), 22 December 1937.
46. Report dated 5 May 1939, 10 pages in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161,
BRITAIN’S SUPPRESSION OF THE ARAB REVOLT IN PALESTINE 21
Box 62, File 1, p. 1, MEC; Ha’Aretz, 18 66. Hugh Foot, A Start in Freedom
August 1938. (London: Hodder, 1964), pp. 51-52;
47. Rosemary Sayigh, The Palestinians:
From Peasants to Revolutionaries
(London: Zed Books, 2007), p. 25.
48. Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm
al-Nidal, pp. 60-61; Ha’Aretz (Evening Issue), 22 December 1937.
49. Jack Binsley, Palestine Police
Service (Montreux: Minerva, 1996), p. 99.
50. Letter, Burr to Parents, n.d.
50. Letter, Burr to Parents, n.d.
[December 1937], Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
51. See the files in M4826/26, Israel State Archive, Jerusalem.
52. Palmer, “Second Battalion,” p. 85; Ha’Aretz, 20 February 1938.
53. Letter, Burr to Parents, 24 February 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD; J & E
Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61,
Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61,
File 3, MEC and material in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 2.
54. Request for Intercession, Abdulla Family by Attorney for Convicts, 7 July 1938, in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 3, p. 3, MEC.
54. Request for Intercession, Abdulla Family by Attorney for Convicts, 7 July 1938, in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 3, p. 3, MEC.
55. For example, a special order to the two battalions tasked with retaking the Old City of Jerusalem from the rebels in October 1938 stated: “Any attempts, even the most minor, at looting, scrounging or souveniring by individual troops or police will be rigorously suppressed.” Special Order by Brig. I. Grant, CO, 20th Infantry Brigade, October 1938, in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 4, MEC.
56. Extracts from the CO’s Quarterly Letter for period ending 31 December 1937 in Essex Regiment Gazette 6, no. 46 (March 1938), p. 282.
56. Extracts from the CO’s Quarterly Letter for period ending 31 December 1937 in Essex Regiment Gazette 6, no. 46 (March 1938), p. 282.
57. Gilbert Shepperd, 4597, p. 64, IWMSA. Quote from Desmond Woods, 23846, IWMSA.
58. Woods, 23846, IWMSA.
59. Arthur Lane, 10295, p. 18, IWMSA. 60. Howbrook, 4619, pp. 35-36, IWMSA. 61. Letter, P. Cleaver to Aunt, 10
February 1937, Cleaver papers, GB 165-0358, MEC.
62. Lane, 10295, pp. 23-24, IWMSA. 63. A Notice of the Office of the
Arab Revolt about the Tragedy of ‘Atil, 11 December 1938, in Zua‘ytir, Watha’iq al-
Haraka, pp. 529, 545.
Haraka, pp. 529, 545.
64. Binsley, Palestine Police Service, pp. 104-05.
65. Letter, Burr to Parents, March 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
mixed Hebrew-English files in S25/10685,
3156 and 8768, Central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem.
67. The Alleged Ill-treatment of Prisoners by F. Newton (sent to the Howard League for Penal Reform), 15
April 1938, in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, p. 94, MEC.
68. Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem, p. 191; Edward Tinker, 4492, pp. 34-35, IWMSA; Charles Smith “Two Revolts in Palestine: An Examination of the British Response to Arab and Jewish Rebellion, 1936-48” (PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1989), pp. 114-19; Anwar Nusseibeh, 28 March 1977, Thames TV Material (not on open access), Lever Arch file: Nigel Maslin, Imperial War Museum Film Archive, London.
68. Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem, p. 191; Edward Tinker, 4492, pp. 34-35, IWMSA; Charles Smith “Two Revolts in Palestine: An Examination of the British Response to Arab and Jewish Rebellion, 1936-48” (PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1989), pp. 114-19; Anwar Nusseibeh, 28 March 1977, Thames TV Material (not on open access), Lever Arch file: Nigel Maslin, Imperial War Museum Film Archive, London.
69. Letters, O’Connor to Wife, 22 October, 2-3 November 1938, O’Connor papers, 3/1, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, London.
70. Author interview, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Amman, 21 June 2009; HC (Hansard) Deb, 28 June 1939, vol. 349,
cc401-02.
71. Tom Segev, One Palestine,
Complete (New York: Holt, 2000), pp. 416-17.
72. Typed two-page document by Edward Keith-Roach, untitled or dated, at the end of which is added pencilled com-ment, Keith-Roach papers, in possession of Mrs. C. Ames-Lewis, London.
73. A Letter from the Fighter Arrested, Subhi al-Khadra, 20 September 1938, in Zua‘ytir, Watha’iq al-Haraka, pp. 505-06, 548.
74. Statement about the Torture of Arabs Arrested in Military Camps and Prisons, 1938-39, in Zua‘ytir, Watha’iq
al-Haraka, pp. 548, 579, 594, 601; Subhi Yasin, Al-Thawra al-‘Arabiyya al-Kubra (fi Falastin) 1936-1939 [The Great
Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-1939] (Damascus: Shifa ‘Amru Haifa, 1959), p. 47.
75. See Palestine Prisons for Howard League for Penal Reform, 6 April 1938, in
J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, pp. 76ff, MEC and Allegations of Ill-treatment of Arabs by British Crown Forces in Palestine (translated from the Arabic by Frances Newton, 19 June 1939), in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, pp. 141-43.
75. See Palestine Prisons for Howard League for Penal Reform, 6 April 1938, in
J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, pp. 76ff, MEC and Allegations of Ill-treatment of Arabs by British Crown Forces in Palestine (translated from the Arabic by Frances Newton, 19 June 1939), in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, pp. 141-43.
22
76. For a full discussion of al-Bassa and Halhul, see Matthew Hughes, “The Practice and Theory of British Counter-Insurgency: The Histories of the Atrocities at the
Palestinian Village of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938-39,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 528-50.
77. Woods, 23846, IWMSA; letter,
77. Woods, 23846, IWMSA; letter,
Raymond Cafferata to Wife, 22 October 1938, Cafferata papers, in possession of Mr. John Robertson (subsequently
moved to the MEC); Harry Arrigonie,
JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES
British Colonialism: 30 Years Serving Democracy or Hypocrisy (Bideford: Lazarus, 1998), pp. 35-36.
78. J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, Files 1-2, MEC.
79. Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem to Miss Trevelyan, 23 June 1939, in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC.
80. Conversation, Lt. Gen. A. Wavell to Brig. J. Evetts, in P. C. Munn, 4503, tape 3,
IWMSA.
IWMSA.
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